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Acharya, Arabinda. Ten Years After 9/11: Rethinking the Jihadist Threat.
London: Routledge, 2013.
The main theme of this book, as explained in its introduction, is that the threat from
“terrorism has morphed from organized entities with clear command and control structures to
‘networks’ or ‘franchises,’ or to individuals acting on their own in ‘leaderless jihad’” (p. 3). Not
all terrorists are created equally. Just as the causes of terrorism differ from country to country, so
do the courses, consequences and responses. “Thus, there cannot be a single overarching war
against terrorism. Similarly, the strategies and tactics to engage the adversary cannot be same for
all and therefore a friend-or-foe categorization can be counterproductive” (p. 7).
Chapter 1 (“9/11 and globalization of violence”) explains how the al-Qaeda terrorist
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the American and allies’ military strikes
have globalized violence to the extent that the wars of terrorism and counterterrorism have
become “a perspective, an orientation, and a discourse for ‘our time,’ the ‘way things are today,’
and ‘how the world has changed.’” And just as ruthlessness and brutality characterize terrorist
gangs, similarly “overtly militaristic policies of the US … have demonstrated extreme use of
hard power with very counterproductive consequences” (p. 11). Several European Union
countries have already distanced themselves from the United States’ global war on terrorism.
The United States, working unilaterally and without regard for the rule of law and human
rights, has globalized the war on terror by becoming engaged in conflicts around the world that
had nothing to do with 9/11. “This is despite the fact that many conflicts, such as in Kashmir, in
the Philippines and Southern Thailand, and Indonesia, were different and predated 9/11. These
conflicts were rooted more in their respective sociological, historical, and political contexts
rather than just religion and radical ideologies” (p. 20).
The globalization of terrorism and counterterrorism has consequently led to extreme
vigilantism and anti-Muslim rhetoric in the United States and Europe where “popularity of rightwing political groups is at an all-time high. In effect terrorism and counterterrorism have merged
into a horrific cycle of mutual provocation” (p. 23). The author, Arabinda Acharya, also believes
that so far only symptoms of terrorism have been addressed, but the real sociopolitical and
economic “root causes of violence and conflict are ignored” (p. 25).
In Chapter 2 (“Construction of the adversary”), the author is asking policy makers to
“know thy enemy.” The chapter draws a valuable distinction between the local and global jihadi
groups. Abdullah Azzam and his protégé, Osama bin Laden, used al-Qaeda as a core and global
inspirer for the worldwide Muslim groups to continue the global jihad at the local levels.
Acharya, however, debunks Samuel Huntington’s theory that there is a clash of civilizations
between Islam and the West simply by arguing the vast majority of people in the Muslim world
do not believe in such a theory from an Islamic point of view. An Islamic struggle with the west
is an al-Qaeda dream that American and Western prosecutors of counterterrorism must not allow
to come true.
Most local jihadist groups are neither related to nor directed by al-Qaeda even if they use
the al-Qaeda brand name. Acharya does not deny the fact that there are homegrown, selfradicalized, “do-it-yourself” jihadists and other “soldiers of fortune” who “can become far more
dangerous when they reach out for support from more established terrorist networks” (p. 35).
The author fully recognizes that the threat from homegrown and local groups is real but many
jihadi groups around the world are discovering that their association with al-Qaeda is more of a
liability than asset (p. 49).
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Chapter 3 (“Strategy of the global jihadist movement”) emphasizes the need to
understand the core ideology the jihadists have been preaching in the pursuit of recruits and
financial resources. The global jihadist movement, like any violent or peaceful sociopolitical or
religious movement, cannot function without a coherent and communicable ideology. There is no
clear consensus among the jihadists and their Muslim antagonist scholars over an ideological
framework. However, the global jihadists have constructed their agenda as a worldwide
confrontation with the West or, as Osama bin Laden framed it, as a war of destiny between
infidelity and Islam, which eventually will lead to the establishment of a universal Islamic
caliphate on earth. The jihadists are engaged in a zero-sum game, which they know they cannot
win militarily. Their jihad has become an ideological warfare wherein they manipulate Islamic
teachings for mass mobilization by “extracting and using selective verses from the holy text” (p.
50).
Even though jihadism is not synonymous with Islam, jihadists nonetheless “are fighting
on behalf of Islam against the enemies of God, epitomized by the US – the ‘Hubal of this age’
and literally ‘satanic’ being in league with the devil” (p. 53). Acharya believes that even though
“suicide is forbidden in Islam and considered an egregious sin in Islamic culture and tradition,”
in the twisted world of jihadists they justify suicide attacks that kill innocent civilians, especially
women, children and the elderly that Islam clearly forbids (p. 60).
Chapter 4 (“Tactics of the jihadist movement”) deals with the jihadists’ tools and skills.
They believe they can defeat the United States just like they forced the former Soviet Union to
withdraw from Afghanistan after a decade-long jihad (1979-1989). While they have failed in
their strategy to convince the average Muslim of their jihadist ideology, they have, however,
succeeded in creating terror wherever they strike. Some of their dramatic and most damaging
strikes have proven skills at organization, command and communication, and strategic selection
of times and targets. Jihadists’ successes against pro-American Muslim governments (the near
enemy) have encouraged recruitment of homegrown terrorists in the West and United States (the
far enemy). Instant news of their terrorist strikes through means of globalized information
technology has enabled the jihadists to convey the main message of their strategic successes and
time-tested tactics. The news creates chaos among victims on the one hand and courage among
prospective recruits on the other.
The Internet is the great enabler allowing jihadists to turn sections of the Web into an
open university for jihad. “The main audiences are the younger generation in the Muslim world
that can now peruse, at their own pace, one big madrassa on the Internet” (p. 68). Some of the
websites, with convenient access and complete anonymity, are virtual training camps that offer
instructions in all sorts of bomb making techniques. Despite a worldwide watch of terrorists’
websites by several top intelligence agencies, the jihadists are still able to recruit and radicalize
the youth in Muslim societies that are victims of both the near and the far enemies of Islam.
Successful indoctrination and outreach programs are glaring success stories of jihadists’
fundraising, target selection and hideouts around the world.
Jihadists also plan for economic warfare with the intent of financially bleeding the enemy
to bankruptcy. Their tactics include, but are not limited to, targeting oil and energy resources and
disrupting the global supply chain. They would like to acquire biological and other weapons of
mass destruction but, so far, they have not succeeded. But citing the FBI’s National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) warning of February 2003, Acharya cautions that alQaeda possesses a crude capability of using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
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weapons, and that a terrorist attack on a Western city using these weapons is “only a matter of
time” (p. 80).
Chapter 5 (“Fighting the jihadist threat”) explains why, 10 years after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, fighting the jihadist threat has not worked as successfully as it should have given the
enormous number of innocent lives lost in terrorism and counterterrorism. In the future, terrorists
will become more difficult to deal with because they are not located in a fixed place or people,
and difficult to be identify and preempt. “Rather, given the radicalized milieu, the more killed,
the more terrorists would be created” (p. 83). Even the grand strategy of the United States failed
to understand the nature of conflict with al-Qaeda. The U.S. war on al-Qaeda became an openended military operation fighting a global insurgency wherever and whenever it was found. The
United States went after several insurgent and terrorist groups; some even did not pose any threat
to the American interests.
Given its unachievable lofty and broad objective, this global war on terror could end up
in complete failure. The U.S. grand strategy involved a kind of deterrence, preemption and
prevention that became overreaction to the threat with the result that “the world is left to fight an
almost perpetually elusive target, with a constantly moving center and focal point, thereby
making it progressively harder to counter” (p. 91).
The global war on terror, especially, in the Muslim World, is unwinnable without the full
cooperation of the Muslim masses and states. They are proactively engaged against terror
networks that have both local and global agendas. The United States going global and alone has
so far failed to engage the Muslim world, where the United States is not seen as an honest agent
of peace and justice. “The more than a decade long fight,” Acharya believes, “has been
characterized by wrong identification of the enemy and the inability of the … US administration
to use soft power to reach out to the Muslim masses” (p. 102).
Chapter 6 (“Ten Years after: Bringing the conflict to an end”) is a candid criticism of
what has been lacking in the United States’ war on terror. Although the United States and
regional states have decimated al-Qaeda’s top leadership, training camps, capacity and
recruitment, the terror group’s anti-U.S./West ideology will sustain for years to come. Most of
the jihadi movements have so far sustained not because of any strength of their ideology but
rather because of America’s extremely indiscriminate killing of innocent people, which has
helped jihadists in legitimizing their war against the United States. Moreover, the U.S. grand
strategy is based on an aggregation that considers the war on terror is a “war against all terrorists
or – far worse – all Muslims simultaneously. This creates enormous potential for overstretch,
exhaustion of popular will, and ultimate failure” (p. 112).
The jihadists have suffered their greatest setback at the hands of secular and prodemocracy protestors of the Arab Spring who rejected the jihadists’ violent rush to grab power or
impose Taliban-style sharia law. The Arab Spring protestors represented common Muslims’
demand for socioeconomic justice, political reforms, and transparent democratic elections that
jihadists love to hate. However, Acharya believes that the Arab Spring has also “exposed the
limitations of the American power in the Arab world with the fall of Washington’s traditional
(authoritarian) allies in the region.” He also believes that a number of attributes of the Arab
Spring “support the argument that the protests could be the undoing of the jihadist project” (p.
115). The Arab Spring nonviolent and pro-democracy demonstrations have “derailed the projects
of the jihadist movement on many fronts … and could mark the beginning of an alternative
narrative to the jihadist ideology” (p. 118).
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In conclusion, Acharya counsels the use of minimum effective use of force, finding
solutions to the real problems the jihadists use as motives for recruitment, engaging Muslim
leaders and communities, and exploiting the internal ideological and tactical contradictions. He
believes that misrepresenting and manipulating the holy text of Islam is the terrorists’ Achilles
heel as Muslim scholars preach against their illegitimate ideology. That is how “the strong
challenge to jihadism comes from within the Muslim community itself” (p. 121). Citing the Pew
Global Attitudes Survey, Acharya believes Muslim nations reject the violent extremism of alQaeda and other jihadi movements and their killing of Muslim and non-Muslim innocent people.
“If this trend continues,” Archaya believes, “it would dry up jihadists’ pool of recruits and
operations would be harder to undertake” (p. 126).
Any book that deals with ongoing regional developments is destined to be left behind by
new events like those currently happening in Syria and Yemen and the newer players like ISIS,
and strange alliances and counter-alliances. Despite the fact that this book is now three years old,
it still serves its readers well by exposing terrorists’ ideology, tactics, strengths and weaknesses.
This well-documented book is also a good critique of U.S. counterterrorism measures,
which, according to the author, have so far failed to identify the true nature and identify of
terrorism. The U.S. war on terror is disproportionately militaristic and has caused the death and
destruction of thousands of innocent Muslim men, women and children. The United States and
the West need the aid, not alienation, of the Muslim world in defeating the ideology and structure
of terrorist movements.
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